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The logistics outsourcing literature emphasises relational governance mechanisms and has 
underplayed the role of formal contractual provisions. This paper empirically examines the 
multiple functions that contracts perform in service exchange governance. Codification, 
safeguarding, coordination, and adaptation functions are linked to contract specification 
schedules, payment mechanisms, (early) termination rights, performance review and 
communication provisions, service variations clauses, and renegotiation provisions. Contracts 
may also embody exchange- or partner-specific learning, albeit to a limited extent. Overall, the 
empirical findings lend support to the functional view of contracting. The functionality of 
contracts extends beyond safeguarding against opportunism and financial losses. In addition to 
offering economic and legal safeguards, contracts are used to coordinate and adapt service 
exchanges in the face of complexity and uncertainty.    
 











1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to empirically examine how contracts govern service exchanges in the 
context of logistics outsourcing. The focus is on formal contracts with legally enforceable 
provisions, rather than implicit contracts and verbal agreements (Lusch and Brown 1996). The 
paper stresses a functional view of contracting which directs attention to the functions that 
contracts perform in addition to safeguarding against opportunism (Schepker et al. 2014). 
Logistics outsourcing, also referred to as third party logistics (3PL), is the established 
practice of contracting out logistics activities or functions that were previously executed in-
house (Selviaridis and Spring 2007). Effective governance of customer-logistics service 
provider (LSP) exchanges is important for achieving cost reduction and improved performance 
benefits (Solakivi, Töyli, and Ojala 2013; Chen, Goan and Huang 2011; Jayaram and Tan 
2010), and formal contracts play a key part in managing exchange relations (Cao and Lumineau 
2015). Consider the example of the UK National Health Service (NHS) outsourcing the 
procurement, storage and distribution of hospital supplies to DHL Supply Chain Ltd. The 
parties have entered a ten-year contract estimated to affect medical goods and services worth 
of £22 billion, which is also expected to result in more than £1 billion of savings by 2016 (NHS 
Supply Chain 2016). Given the strategic importance and long-term horizon of this deal, it would 
be expected that the formal contract actively contributes to effective governance e.g. through 
safeguarding the investments made by the counterparts, but also through coordinating activities 
and facilitating adaptations to service delivery.  
The existing logistics outsourcing literature, however, appears to be less concerned with 
the role of formal contracts in exchange governance and has mainly focused on relational 
mechanisms (Marasco 2008). For instance, several studies draw on a relationship marketing 
approach to study the impact of behavioral attributes on 3PL exchange outcomes. Trust, 
commitment and collaboration can, amongst other factors, enhance the outcomes of 3PL 
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alliances and increase customer loyalty (Wallenburg et al. 2010; Knemeyer and Murphy 2005; 
Lambert, Emmelhainz, and Gardner 1999; Moore and Cunningham 1999). More recent research 
has focused on the role of fairness in establishing successful 3PL relationships in terms of trust 
building, cooperation and proactive performance improvement. Rossiter-Hofer, Knemeyer and 
Murphy (2012), in particular, submit that both procedural justice (i.e. perceived fairness of 
policy or process associated with distribution of relationship outcomes) and distributive justice 
(i.e. perceived fairness of outcome/reward distribution) impact positively on customer’s trust, 
cooperation and long-term relationship orientation.  
The functions of formal contracts in this context are much less examined. Existing studies 
describe the typical contract structure e.g. in terms of contract duration, expected behaviors, 
service level targets, and risk and liabilities allocation (Wilding and Juriado 2004; Logan 2000; 
Boyson et al. 1999). Such literature, however, offers limited insights into how specific 
contractual provisions may contribute to exchange governance (Hofenk et al. 2011). This is 
important as contracts perform multiple functions (Schepker et al. 2014) e.g. by defining 
exchanges, reducing uncertainty, coordinating and adjusting service delivery and incentivising 
innovation (Datta and Roy 2013; Caniëls, Geldeman, and Vermeulen 2012; Wagner and Sutter 
2012; Lukassen and Wallenburg 2010).  
The empirical literature on the role of contracts in logistics outsourcing governance is 
rather limited. Selviaridis and Norrman (2015) have recently examined the design and 
enactment of performance-oriented provisions included in logistics service contracts, and 
identified challenges impacting their effectiveness in terms of customer and LSP incentive 
alignment. Forslund (2009) suggests that contractual performance goals and indicators 
contribute to performance measurement and management processes, but that additional 
capabilities (e.g. data analysis) are needed. Halldórsson and Skjøtt-Larsen (2006) find that the 
formal contract cannot in itself deal with uncertainty associated with changing volumes and 
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prices, and thus relational mechanisms are also deployed to adapt the service exchange. 
Selviaridis and Spring (2010) argue that the contract provides a basis for ongoing dialogue and 
exchange adaptation in cases of high uncertainty, and demonstrate the interplay of contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms. Similarly, Hofenk et al. (2011) conclude that formal 
contracts, trust and commitment are complementary in achieving effectiveness in 3PL 
relationships. The 3PL exchange is conceived as a dynamic process where the exchange 
definition is subject to continuous evaluation and adjustment and is only temporarily codified 
through the contractual specification (Selviaridis and Spring 2010). Each exchange is also part 
of a broader relationship frame and hence prior interactions influence its current design (Gadde 
and Huthlèn 2010; Marasco 2008).  
Collectively this research stream remains divided over the role of formal contracts in 
logistics outsourcing governance reflecting also trends in the broader governance literature 
(Cao and Lumineau 2015; Vandaele et al. 2007; Klein-Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 
2005). Detailed contracts are either perceived as signals of lack of trust (Lambert et al. 1999), 
or complements to trust, commitment, flexibility and relational norms to ensure exchange 
effectiveness (Hofenk et al. 2011; Boyson et al. 1999). Despite their contributions, the above 
studies do not provide in-depth empirical insights into the functions that specific contractual 
provisions and clauses perform. This paper addresses this gap by empirically studying the 
functions of 3PL contracts in service exchange governance, considering also their interplay with 
relational mechanisms (Rossiter-Hofer et al. 2012; Lambert et al. 1999). The following research 
question (RQ) is posed: How do formal contractual provisions govern service exchanges in 
logistics outsourcing? 
The RQ is pursued through four in-depth case studies of contractual relationships in the 
context of the UK logistics services industry. Data collection comprised 38 semi-structured 
interviews with managers of LSPs and their customers and review of relevant documents, 
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notably service contracts. The study draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) and 
contracting and relational exchange literatures to develop an analytical frame of the design and 
functionality of contractual provisions in service exchange governance.  
The research unpacks the function of contracts in service exchange governance, an issue 
that has hitherto been underplayed in the logistics outsourcing literature (Marasco 2008). It 
empirically demonstrates how specific contractual provisions are used to codify the service 
exchange, to safeguard parties against perceived risks and opportunism, to coordinate their 
actions to improve service delivery, and to adapt the service exchange in response to 
environmental changes. The paper also builds upon recent efforts to examine the role of 
contracts in managing (service) complexity (Kreye et al. 2015; Roehrich and Lewis 2014) by 
suggesting that contract functionality extends beyond safeguarding. In addition to offering 
economic and legal safeguards, contracts are used to coordinate and adapt service exchanges in 
the face of service complexity and uncertainty. Managers involved in contracting for logistics 
services should consider the specific conditions upon which contractual provisions and their 
associated functions are to be stressed to improve exchange effectiveness.    
The following section reviews the relevant literature, and Section 3 discusses the research 
methodology. Section 4 analyses the cases, while Section 5 develops propositions regarding 
contract functions and discusses the findings and their research implications. Section 6 draws 
out contributions, managerial implications and future research avenues.  
 
2. Exchange governance and contract functions   
TCE theory underpins much of the contracting literature and has been widely applied to explain 
outsourcing decisions and the governance of 3PL exchanges in particular (Selviaridis and 
Spring 2007). Since TCE is well-established within operations and supply management (Zheng, 
Roehrich, and Lewis 2008), this section focuses on the aspects most relevant to the present 
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study. TCE posits that exchange attributes determine governance choices (market vs. hierarchy) 
with a view to minimising transaction costs and efficiently governing economic exchanges 
(Williamson 1991; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1991). The attributes originally stressed were 
asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency (Williamson 1985). Asset specificity, 
referring to idiosyncratic assets that cannot be easily redeployed to other uses, creates a 
safeguarding problem and explains incentives for vertical integration and long-term 
relationship development (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Uncertainty arises either when it is 
difficult to predict and specify ex ante exchange contingencies (environmental uncertainty), or 
when performance cannot be verified ex post (behavioural uncertainty). Uncertainty creates an 
adaptation problem raising the costs of adjusting agreements (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). 
Frequency refers to transaction recurrence; high frequency provides an incentive to vertically 
integrate (Williamson 1985).   
The market-hierarchy continuum was elaborated by explicating relational governance and 
‘hybrids’ as an alternative (to hierarchy) way of safeguarding asset-specific transactions and 
adapting to changing circumstances (Williamson 1991). However, TCE has been critisised for 
understating the role of social interactions and trust (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006; 
Poppo and Zenger 2002). The TCE’s assertion that trust is a redundant concept insofar as it 
does not promote calculative behavior of exchange parties (Williamson 1993) is dismissed by 
other scholars (Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorderhaven 1997; McNeil 1980). The notion of trust 
goes beyond coercive action and self-interest and results from relationship-specific norms and 
social bonds. Trust, in combination with coercion and incentives, reduce the perceived risk of 
opportunism (Nooteboom et al. 1997). Subsequent literature has supported this view and 
suggested that formal contracts and trust can reinforce each other and positively influence 
exchange performance (Caniëls et al. 2012; Lazarinni, Miller, and Zenger 2004; Cannon, 
Achrol and Gundlach 2000). TCE, contracting and relational exchange literatures are 
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synthesised below to develop an analytical frame of the design of formal contractual provisions, 
and the functions they can perform in service exchange governance.  
 
2.1 Exchange attributes and contract design  
TCE underpins a structural approach to contracting which stresses the ‘optimal’ contract 
structure in terms of safeguarding investments and minimising opportunism (Schepker et al. 
2014). TCE posits that contract design should be aligned with exchange attributes to achieve 
efficient governance (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Williamson 1985). However, a TCE-inspired 
(structural) view of contracting is incomplete since: (a) it underplays the role of partner-specific 
experience and knowledge and trust, which may also influence contract design (Håkansson and 
Snehota 2002; Argyres and Liebeskind 1999; Ring and Van de Ven 1992), and (b) it focuses 
on the safeguarding role of contracts and understates their other potential functions e.g. 
exchange coordination and adaptation (Schepker et al. 2014; Heide 1994). In line with the 
conceptualization of the 3PL exchange as a dynamic process (Selviaridis, Agndal, and Axelsson 
2011; Halldórsson and Skjøtt-Larsen 2006), this paper adopts a broader view of contracting 
which considers the role of relational experience as well as the multiple functions of contracts 
(in addition to safeguarding). The study focuses on two exchange attributes influencing the 
design and functionality of contracts, namely perceived uncertainty and relational experience. 
These are discussed in detail below.  
 
2.1.1 Perceived uncertainty  
Perceived uncertainty originates in TCE and refers both to behavioural and environmental 
sources of uncertainty (Williamson 1985). The former is related to difficulties in evaluating 
performance ex post and the associated perceived risks of moral hazard and opportunistic 
behaviour (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Environmental uncertainty refers to the dynamism 
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and unpredictability of the market environment within which exchanges occur. This dynamic 
environment makes the definition of current and future exchange requirements problematic 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Environmental uncertainty relates both to volume and 
technological uncertainty; while the former incentivises vertical integration, the latter makes 
market governance preferable (Geyskens et al. 2006). Within the bounds of durable inter-firm 
relationships, the adaptation problem can be addressed through contractual provisions 
emphasising flexibility, contingency planning, and frequent communications (Argyres, 
Bercovitz, and Mayer 2007; Poppo and Zenger 2002).   
Perceived uncertainty is also closely associated with the complexity of service exchanges 
(Badinelli et al. 2012; Argyres and Mayer 2007). The extant literature has associated 
complexity with various characteristics of service exchanges and existing definitions of service 
complexity depend also on their purpose and focus (Kreye, Roehrich, and Lewis 2015). In their 
comprehensive review of service complexity, Benedetinni and Neely (2012) defined it in terms 
complicatedness and difficulty. The former refers to the number of service activities 
/components and their interactions into delivering multiple functions, while the latter to the 
amount of resources needed to perform sophisticated functions. However, this definition of 
complexity underplays the role of service-related interactions (e.g. with customers) and the 
dynamic nature of services (in terms of the need to adjust the service to fit changing 
environmental conditions) which may also introduce uncertainty (Sampson and Spring 2012; 
Badinelli et al. 2012).  
Service complexity is particularly relevant here because the level of complexity may 
influence the design and functionality of formal contracts (e.g. Roehrich and Lewis 2014) and 
the development of (advanced) contracting and relational capabilities (Kreye et al. 2015). 
Service delivery including with multiple service components interacting with one another to 
fulfil multiple functions often presents difficulties in terms of specifying requirements ex ante. 
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Such service requirements are also subject to ongoing adjustment (Selviaridis et al. 2011). This 
raises the level of perceived complexity and uncertainty and may result in more detailed 
contracts to provide safeguards against potential opportunism (Kreye et al. 2015). Extensive 
contracts also entail the development of contracting capabilities, which may evolve gradually 
as contracting parties adapt contracting terms to increase exchange effectiveness (Spring and 
Araujo 2014). Hartmann et al. (2014) stress the process by which buyers and suppliers in public-
private infrastructure projects learn to contract with each other e.g. by defining service tasks 
and requirements and configuring incentive systems. As part of this process of contractual 
interactions relational capabilities (e.g. joint problem solving and trust building) are also built. 
The effectiveness of elaborate contracts can be questionable, and more simplified formal 
agreements in combination with relational capabilities may render better results in terms of 
exchange performance (Roehrich and Lewis 2014).  
However, the extant literature stresses the role of legal and economic safeguards 
(safeguarding function) and provides limited evidence of contractual provisions that help 
manage complexity and uncertainty through coordination or adaptation of the exchange. 
Similarly, the literature refers to capabilities required to perform the safeguarding function of 
contracts, and tends to understate contract design and execution capabilities necessary to use 
contracts as tools for exchange coordination and adaptation (see Spring and Araujo 2014). 
 
2.1.2 Relational experience  
Relational experience refers to accumulated knowledge of the counterpart’s business 
requirements, goals, intentions and expectations (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007; Ulaga and 
Eggert 2006; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002). Partner-specific learning is enabled through buyer-
supplier interactions and information and knowledge sharing at multiple organisational levels 
(Dyer and Singh 1998). Relational experience also considers the influence of prior exchange 
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experiences and trust in the design and use of contractual provisions. The broader context and 
history of a business relationship can influence the current exchange and its formal design 
(Gadde and Huthlèn 2010; Argyres and Liebeskind 1999). The extent to which extensive 
contractual provisions are invoked depends also on the broader relationship atmosphere 
(Williamson 1985) and the reliance on informal mechanisms to adapt and resolve disputes 
regarding the distribution of outcomes/rewards (Rossiter-Hofer et al. 2012). In presence of 
strong relational ties, it might be counter-productive to write extensive formal contracts 
detailing all potential contingencies (Lusch and Brown 1996).  
The existing literature suggests that partner- and exchange-specific learning can influence 
contractual provisions and their level of extensiveness. Mayer and Argyres (2004) show how 
in repeated exchange situations parties learn how to contract and collaborate with each other, 
and how successive contracts are modified to enhance communication and information flow, 
clarify responsibilities and expectations, plan for contingencies and modify service 
specifications. Prior exchange experience may result in more detailed task descriptions and 
contingency planning (Argyres et al. 2007). Reuer and Arino (2007) find that prior interactions 
lead to less detailed monitoring and adaptation provisions, but they do not influence 
enforcement provisions (e.g. arbitration). Similarly, Vanneste and Puranam (2010) suggest that 
repeated exchanges lead to more extensive technical provisions, but leave legal clauses 
unaffected. Ryall and Sampson (2009) find that inter-firm learning leads to more detailed 
contracts overall. However, trust development may also lead to less elaborate intellectual 
property rights provisions. Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) suggest that inter-firm learning leads to 
more extensive monitoring, dispute resolution mechanisms and contingency planning, but it 





2.2 The multiple functions of contracts 
Reflecting a functional approach to contracting (Schepker et al. 2014), this paper suggests that 
contracts can serve multiple functions beyond offering legal and economic safeguards.  
The safeguarding function is well established and is grounded on TCE theory (Schepker 
et al. 2014). In response to increasing complexity and environmental uncertainty resulting from 
the multiple and highly interactive service components and/or long-term exchange horizons, 
extensive contracts with detailed clauses that safeguard asset-specific investments are 
developed (Roehrich and Lewis 2014). This is intended to protect parties against potential 
opportunism and financial and operational uncertainties (Kern and Willcocks 2000; Williamson 
1985). Contracts include several provisions and clauses that serve as legal and economic 
safeguards, such as the assignment of property rights and decision control rights to manage 
externalities, or to protect parties with low negotiating power (Klein-Woolthuis et al. 2005; 
Adegbesan and Higgins 2011). Early termination rights allow for contract exit and help combat 
potential moral hazard (Argyres and Mayer 2007). Dispute resolution mechanisms serve as 
legal safeguards, although their implementation also depends on the negotiating approach of 
the parties and the emphasis put on their contractual rights and obligations (Lumineau and 
Malhotra 2011). The payment mechanism also serves as an economic safeguard in that it 
determines the allocation of financial gains and risks (Datta and Roy 2013; Wagner and Sutter 
2012; Liu et al. 2009). Cost-plus contracts, for instance, reduce financial risks for suppliers in 
cases of high environmental uncertainty (Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Corts and Sigh 2004). 
Beyond safeguarding, contracts can perform a codification function (Mayer and Argyres 
2004). Contracts, and the process of contracting in itself, help in constructing and codifying a 
shared exchange definition and facilitate the development of mutual understanding about 
parties’ goals, expectations, and requirements during the exchange (Lumineau, Frechet, and 
Puthod 2011; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna, and Seppanen 2005). Service elements (e.g. resources) 
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are codified through the contract, but deviations from the contractual specification can instigate 
processes of adaptation ex post (Lindberg and Nordin 2008). In the context of this ongoing 
evaluation and adjustment process contracts serve as temporary codification devices 
(Selviaridis and Spring 2010).  
Contracts may also serve as coordination devices by including provisions that delineate 
the roles and responsibilities of contracting parties, explicate processes for monitoring of 
performance as well as appropriate behaviors and establishing formal communication channels 
across organisational boundaries (Schepker et al. 2014; Reuer and Arino 2007). Ménard (2004) 
suggests that coordination through contracts is a common feature among joint ventures, 
alliances and other ‘hybrid’ types. Coordination is enabled by clauses that establish formal 
routines for information and knowledge sharing along multiple management levels, which may 
enhance communication flows (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Provisions 
for performance reviews and ongoing monitoring of behaviors (e.g. clauses that stipulate 
number of employees working on a project) may also increase communication and coordination 
of actions (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Faems et al. 2008).  
In the face of environmental uncertainty, formal contracts perform an adaptation function 
in that they allow for adjustments resulting from market changes, or from learning endogenous 
to the exchange (Schepker et al. 2014). In such cases contracts are used as broad frameworks 
that leave room for ex post adjustment of investments given that continuity of relationships is 
valued (Ménard and Valceschini 2005; Mouzas and Ford 2006). Contractual provisions that 
perform an adaptation function include contingency planning clauses (Argyres et al. 2007; Luo 
2002), clauses for price adjustments, as well as provisions for renegotiation of key terms (e.g. 
resources or budget) at regular intervals to account for environmental changes (Schepker et al. 
2014; Crocker and Reynolds 1993).      
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In addition to the above, a subtler functionality of contracts has been proposed in the 
literature. Contracts can also perform a learning function insofar as exchange- and partner-
specific learning, joint improvements and efficient collaboration methods developed during 
prior exchanges are explicated and embodied into renewed agreements (Mayer and Argyres 
2004; Coltman et al. 2009). This process may also lead to more detailed contracting over time 
affecting specific contractual clauses (see Vanneste and Puranam 2010; Ryall and Sampson 
2009). The learning function is closely associated with the codification function in that lessons 
learned regarding the exchange and the partner are essentially codified through successive 
agreements. In this sense, learning and codification complement each other and contracts serve 
as repositories of knowledge (Mayer and Argyres 2004). However, the codification function is 
broader in scope referring also to (temporarily) stabilised exchange definitions and goals in 
newly-formed relationships (Selviaridis and Spring 2010).  
The safeguarding, coordination and adaptation functions of contracts can either 
complement or substitute each other depending on the types of contractual clauses invoked, and 
the broader relationship frame within which contracts are used (Schepker et al. 2014; Collins 
1999). Lumineau and Malhotra (2011), for instance, argue that coordination and safeguarding 
functions serve as complements during dispute resolution when a ‘mind set of aligning 
interests’ dominates. Safeguarding provisions may substitute for coordination or adaptation 
ones when relationship continuity is not valued and litigation action is the preferred option to 
deal with a breach of obligations (Collins 1999). Existing research, nonetheless, provides scant 
empirical insights into when (i.e. under which conditions) contracts perform safeguarding, 
coordination and adaptation functions in ways that reinforce relational mechanisms, and how 
(see Cao and Lumineau 2015; Schepker et al. 2014).  
In sum, the literature review suggests that perceived uncertainty and relational experience 
have a bearing on the design and functionality of formal contractual provisions, to the extent 
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these dominate over, or used as complements to, relational mechanisms. In addition to 
safeguarding investments, formal contractual provisions may perform codification, 
coordination, adaptation and learning functions in exchange governance. The empirical study 
presented in the following examines these functions in the context of logistics outsourcing. 
 
3. Research method  
A multiple-case design was adopted since there is limited empirical evidence of what functions 
contractual provisions perform in logistics outsourcing governance. Hence, case-based research 
was deemed appropriate for gaining in-depth empirical insights and developing theory (Voss, 
Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich 2002) i.e. propositions regarding the functions of contracts in relation 
to perceived uncertainty and relational experience. Case study research was also suitable in 
terms of the theory-method link (Dubois and Araujo 2007). In particular, 3PL is conceptualised 
as a dynamic process entailing exchange adaptation, experience and knowledge accumulation 
over time. Case-based research was appropriate for retrospectively studying (Leonard-Barton 
1990) how specific contractual provisions functioned in managing and adapting service 
exchanges and how they interacted with partner-specific experience accumulation, 
collaboration, and trust effects.  
The research entailed a ‘theory-matching’ process of iterating between existing literature 
and empirical evidence (Ragin 1992). The analytical frame, empirical research and cross-case 
analysis were thus co-evolving to match empirical evidence with literature (Dubois and Gadde 
2002) and develop theory regarding contract functions. More specifically, the initial interviews 
challenged the reported dominance of relational mechanisms and stressed the role of contracting 
in governing 3PL exchanges. Literature on contractual governance and TCE was subsequently 
reviewed to include in the preliminary analytical frame, and to empirically examine how 
perceived uncertainty and relational experience can influence contract design and functionality. 
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That frame directed further data collection and analysis (Dubois and Gadde 2002) regarding 
contract functions in the studied cases. 
Four cases of 3PL contractual relationships were selected based on theoretical 
considerations (Dubois and Araujo 2007), i.e. on perceived uncertainty and relational 
experience attributes. Table 1 presents information about the contractual relationships in focus 
and the levels of perceived uncertainty and relational experience that the cases exhibited. It is 
noted that cases A, B and C concern the same LSP and its service contracts with three different 
customers. It was envisaged that the (contrary) replication logic (Yin 2003) would help identify 
theoretically important similarities and differences regarding the functions that contractual 
provisions performed. The process of case selection was in line with the iterative nature of the 
research process (Ragin 1992). More specifically, the first two cases (cases A and B) exhibited 
high levels of relational experience and trust building effects based on successful past exchange 
experiences. However, they differed in terms of perceived uncertainty and service complexity. 
These insights were used to sample two further cases (cases C and D) in close consultation with 
key contacts of the LSP companies. These cases were chosen because contracting parties had 
no trading history and limited relational experience. Subsequent analysis suggested differences 
between those two cases in terms of perceived uncertainty and service complexity. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
3.1 Data collection and analysis 
Data were collected through two main sources. Review of organisational documents (notably 
contracts agreements, performance evaluation records, minutes of meetings and email-
exchanges) was triangulated (Yin 2003) with 38 semi-structured interviews both with service 
provider and customer managers from multiple functions (Sales, Commercial, Operations and 
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IT from providers’ side; Logistics, Purchasing and Customer Services from customers’ side). 
The interview guide and the list of interviewees are provided in Appendices 1 and 2 
respectively.  
Documents and archival records such as meeting memos and email exchanges between 
provider and customer managers proved crucial in following up and resolving contrasting 
interview accounts of certain exchange events (e.g. issues during negotiations and impact on 
contract design). The interviews, whose average duration was approximately an hour, covered 
both contractual and relational aspects of logistics outsourcing governance e.g. the design and 
role of formal contracts and the level of trust and collaboration. They also covered multiple 
exchange stages (i.e. specification, supplier selection, contacting and post-contract execution 
and evaluation of exchanges). Real time accounts of post-contract execution and evaluation and 
related adaptations were combined with retrospective data (Leonard-Barton 1990) which 
helped to reconstruct key events leading up to contract agreement. All but three interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. In those instances, where interviewees did not permit recording, 
detailed notes were taken and followed up immediately after the interview to maximise data 
accuracy and comprehensiveness.  
Data analysis was conducted in parallel with data collection with the aid of the ATLAS.ti 
software to organise and manage interview transcripts, notes and archival records. The evolving 
analytical frame informed both within- and cross-case analyses and guided data coding, which 
was iterative in nature (Ragin 1992). Initially, open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990) was used 
to conduct analysis at the case level. This resulted in in-depth understanding of how, and to 
what extent, certain contractual clauses performed a safeguarding, codification, safeguarding, 
coordination, adaptation, or learning function. The code manager within ATLAS.ti was used to 
assign codes to transcribed interviews and document sections based on extant theory (e.g., 
‘performance review’, ‘service adaptation’).  
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As a next step axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990) was used to group codes into 
higher-level categories (e.g. ‘coordination’). The codes were also refined to reflect emerging 
links between attributes and contract functions (e.g., ‘perceived uncertainty and coordination’). 
Cross-case comparisons helped to identify patterns of contract functions and their influence by 
perceived uncertainty and relational experience. Manually constructed cross-case tables (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994), the main of which are provided in Sections 4 and 5 aided the cross-case 
analysis. The analysis did not reveal any consistent patterns regarding the prominence of 
specific functions across exchange stages. Although coordination and adaptation functions were 
more relevant to the post-contract execution and evaluation stage (as expected), no specific 
patterns were found regarding the safeguarding, codification and learning functions. The data 
did not allow for drawing definitive links between contract functionality and exchange stages, 
and further research is needed in this respect.  
 
3.2 Case study quality criteria   
Four criteria were applied to ensure methodological rigor (Yin 2003). Internal validity was 
tackled through using different theoretical lenses (TCE and relational exchange governance) to 
interpret cross-case findings (Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008). Another way was 
representing the data in tabular forms (see Sections 4 and 5) to facilitate within- and cross-case 
analyses (Miles and Huberman 1994). Construct validity was ensured through: (a) triangulating 
retrospective accounts of exchange events with documents (Schwenk 1985) and real-time data 
(Leonard-Barton 1990) on exchange adaptations; (b) conducting interviews with provider and 
customer managers from various functions to compare and contrast their views (Huber and 
Power 1985) and complement data on exchange aspects that provider/ customer interviewees 
lacked knowledge of (see Appendix 2); (c) selecting multiple informants who either served a 
key role throughout the exchange process or were involved in specific stages (Golden 1992); 
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(d) sending written case reports back to prime contacts for feedback and accuracy checks (Voss 
et al. 2002); (e) obtaining feedback from peer researchers on tentative conclusions, at regular 
intervals (Gibbert et al. 2008). External validity was addressed by collecting rich data about the 
3PL contractual relations in focus so that readers could potentially relate to and ‘transfer’ 
findings to other contexts (Voss et al. 2002). Also, by defining specific dimensions (perceived 
uncertainty and relational experience) based on which the cases were selected to achieve 
analytical generalisation (Gibbert et al. 2008). Finally, reliability concerns were minimised 
through: (a) developing and using an interview guide for data collection across cases, see 
Appendix 1 (Yin 2003); (b) developing and continuously updating the ATLAS.ti database 
(interview transcripts and quotations, codes, memos) to ensure the full documentation of the 
data analysis procedure (Voss et al. 2002); (c) creating an interviewee database (Miles and 
Huberman 1994), see Appendix 2.  
 
4. Analysis of the cases  
This section analyses the four cases, focusing on the functions that the formal contractual 
provisions perform in logistics outsourcing governance. The analysis is aided by Tables 2 and 
3 which summarise the key findings.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.1 Case A 
This case concerns a renewed contract for warehousing and distribution, installation and 
demonstration of office equipment products. The case exhibited extensive perceived 
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uncertainty and relational experience (for details see Table 1). The customer perceived the re-
tendering process as uncertain due to loss of logistics know-how. As the customer’s Logistics 
Contract Director admitted: “[…] managing supply and demand is seen as core competence, 
but with regard to physical logistics activities we don’t have the level of expertise required”. 
However, the provider’s in-depth knowledge of customer requirements and the reference to 
successful past collaboration offset the customer’s perceived complexity of the service and led 
to a rather complete contractual specification at the renewal point, with minimum deviations or 
disputes regarding reward distribution ex post. The ‘assignment specification’ appended to the 
main agreement codified the required service activities, processes and resources (see Table 2). 
A cost-plus payment mechanism was designed to address the customer’s uncertainty regarding 
service requirements and allowed for monthly variations in resource levels and costs. The 
agreement also stipulated financial penalties for service failures attributable to provider, and 
excluded the actions of the other parties such as the customer (e.g. product installation failure 
due to production defects). Such penalties were escalating according to the failure extent (%) 
and significance of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). An exit clause was also included to 
safeguard assets and allocate liabilities. Short-term vehicle leases were imposed to reduce 
customer liabilities in case of exchange termination (Table 3).  
The contract provided for regular performance review meetings. The customer’s 
perceived uncertainty resulted in provisions for monthly review meetings to monitor logistics 
resource utilisation and associated costs. The monthly reviews were also performative in that 
they helped to identify service improvements and instigated coordinated actions by the two 
parties (Table 3). The contract also established formal communication channels. However, due 
to extensive relational experience the exchange parties relied mostly on informal mechanisms 
such as strategic reviews and joint projects at the operational level to set improvement targets 
(e.g. improving installation success rate). A ‘services variation’ clause offered the option to 
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adjust activity and resource levels. This provision was not used, though, partly because of the 
provider’s good understanding of operational realities, and partly because of the payment 
mechanism. As the provider’s Business Development (BD) General Manager put it: “The 
contract is open-book […] so if there are variations, they tend to be dealt with at an operational 
level, rather than in a detailed contractual way”. 
During the previous ten-year contract term the parties focused on developing the solution 
(e.g. product assembly and installation activities) and investing in a larger UK central 
warehouse. The activity and resource scope expansion during the previous exchange period 
were contractually dealt with through agreement addendums and appended letters that formed 
the basis for negotiating the renewed deal. This process reflected a lot of learning, cost 
efficiencies and service improvements. These improvements (most of which resulted from 
extra-contractual joint projects) were capitalised and translated into stricter service levels (e.g. 
product installation success rate) under the renewed contract.  
 
4.2 Case B 
This case refers to a three-year renewed contract for distribution of paint products, with limited 
perceived uncertainty and extensive relational experience (see Table 1). The service exchange 
definition was codified in the ‘service specification’ schedule of the contract, detailing the 
required activities and resources. The service processes and performance levels were described 
in less detail. For instance, a single service level target of 99.8% On-Time In-Full (OTIF) 
deliveries was agreed on the basis of the previous positive exchange experiences (see Table 2). 
The mutual understanding of operational issues resulted in minimum deviations from the 
contractual specification schedule ex-post. The 99.8% delivery target was not linked to financial 
penalties in cases of provider non-compliance (Table 3) due to relational experience and 
customer trust on provider competences. The customer’s Commercial Buyer confirmed that: 
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“They [provider] had the ability to do the job, and a proven track record”. However, the 
contract established the provider’s obligation to identify and analyse its service failures and 
implement corrective actions accordingly. 
The contract also included an early termination clause (Table 3) as it became apparent 
during the negotiations that the central warehouse had to be relocated. The implications of such 
relocation in terms of transport network design, resources and costs were difficult to predict at 
the time and hence parties decided to include safeguards against the perceived uncertainty of a 
sub-optimum location decision. As the provider’s Commercial Manager explained: “[…] we 
had to come up with some wording that would enable potentially an early termination of the 
contract if we couldn’t cope with an alternative solution that was acceptable”. Customer 
interviewees also explained that the early termination clause offered protection against 
potentially inappropriate increase of costs and prices. From the provider’s side, uncertainty was 
addressed through a provision for upward adjustment of provider’s operational charges, on the 
condition that such cost increases would be demonstrable (Table 3). This clause also explicated 
allocation of exchange costs and rewards, but it was not used. 
The contract payment mechanism was based on a combination of fixed and variable 
charges. An annual service budget, options for annual cost renegotiations and quarterly 
performance reviews were also catered for in the contract. In addition to formal monitoring and 
communication provisions, the parties exchanged information through extra-contractual 
strategic reviews and efficiency improvement projects. For example, the provider worked 
outside the scope of its contractual obligations to reduce delivery frequency levels (from five-
to three-day deliveries per week) and transport costs without affecting end-customer service 
levels. The contract also allowed for adaptation of activity and resource levels and costs (see 
Table 3). In retrospect, this clause was not used due to limited deviations from contract 
specification ex post.  
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All cost and service improvements (e.g. delivery and product loss/ damage) were 
considered during contract renewal. A previously-used clause specifying conditions upon 
which financial penalties would apply for under-performance (e.g. delivery target) was 
excluded from the renewed contract due to trust in provider’s competence and proven delivery 
performance. The renewed contract also reflected the gradual reduction of logistics resources 
(closing down UK warehouses and cross-docks) as part of strategic reviews and cost-reduction 
projects. Knowledge accumulated during past exchanges was used to renegotiate provider 
liability limits for lost and damaged products (in litres of paint per annum). The provider agreed 
to reduce liability limits on the grounds that past performance reviews showed that there was a 
low product damage record (Table 3). 
 
4.3 Case C 
This case concerns a contract for warehousing, cross-docking, call centre services and home 
deliveries of furniture products. The case exhibited extensive perceived uncertainty and limited 
relational experience (see Table 1). The extensive environmental uncertainty for both parties 
meant that the exchange was broadly codified through the service specification schedule putting 
emphasis on resources and logistics volumes based on forecast sales. Specifications of 
processes and systems were incomplete as several requirements were evolving (Table 2). 
Certain clauses catered for the logistics provider’s perceived uncertainty regarding the furniture 
retailer’s UK venture. A ‘third party guarantor’ clause provided safeguards against provider’s 
non-payment risks (Table 3). In addition, the provider’s Commercial Manager confirmed that 
“[…] the contract dictates that that we are appointed as an exclusive contractor for this 8-year 
period, so they can’t actually use another 3PL […] in case they need more logistics resources 
in the future, we will provide those”.  
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The agreement also included an early termination clause and defined allocation of assets 
and liabilities in case of the failure of the customer’s UK venture. It also imposed one-year 
warehouse leases to facilitate potential termination and delimit the customer’s capital 
commitments in case of termination. The early termination clause was requested by the provider 
due to its dedicated investments (distribution centre) and capacity commitments for the specific 
customer. Given the customer’s evolving requirements and the perceived uncertainty regarding 
the realisation of forecast sales and logistics volumes, this exit clause safeguarded against 
associated financial risks. The open-book, cost-plus mechanism also helped to address this 
uncertainty and provided safeguards against financial losses arising from the deviations 
between forecast resource levels and costs and actual ones.   
The contract defined several KPIs (e.g. 99.5% on time delivery) linked to financial 
penalties to protect the customer. It also linked these targets with monthly and quarterly 
meetings to review performance (Table 3). The monthly review meetings proved instrumental 
to jointly identifying major discrepancies between forecast and actual logistics volumes six 
months after exchange commencement, and to adapt the service. As the provider’s Senior 
Operations Manager explained, “[…] the solution was adapted because we have implemented 
a logistics solution for a far greater demand in terms of volume, so our client’s expectation was 
that they would achieve a higher level of sales within their stores which in turn would mean a 
higher level of activity for ourselves”. Such adaptation was enabled through the ‘service 
variations’ and renegotiations clauses (see Table 3). These were called upon to reduce activity 
and resource levels (e.g. warehouses and trucks) by 50% in line with actual sales levels. This 
process was facilitated by the one-year break clauses included in the warehouse leasing 
agreement. According to provider interviewees, this resource adaptation ensured that the 
customer was not losing money and that the exchange was economically viable in the long-
term. The expectation at that time was that the relationship would continue.  
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These resource and cost reductions were reflected in the contract through schedule 
amendments (service specification, costs and annual budget). In addition, the parties realised 
that the original payment mechanism was not viable. In particular, the provider’s fee was fixed 
as a percentage of annual budgeted costs (rather than actual costs). Considering the over-
estimated first year’s budget, that meant that the provider was gaining a greater proportion of 
the budget as a management fee causing cash flow problems to the customer. The review project 
was thus perceived by provider interviewees as an act of fairness/justice towards the customer 
to minimise its loss. The payment mechanism was amended to a fixed fee as percentage of 
actual operational costs to ensure that further deviations from the (revised) sales forecast and 
logistics budget would not cause financial imbalances. The revised payment mechanism was 
also reflected in the contract through schedule amendments. 
 
4.4 Case D 
This case refers to a five-year contract for distribution of industrial minerals (e.g. sand and soda 
ash). It exhibited limited perceived uncertainty and relational experience (Table 1). The limited 
relational experience meant that the service exchange was only broadly codified in the 
‘statement of work’ (SOW) schedule appended to the contract. The exchange parties focused 
on resource and cost savings resulting from restructuring the transport operation (e.g. reducing 
the number of distribution vehicles and trailers as well as ‘empty running’ of vehicles) and put 
less emphasis on service processes and activities (Table 2). The contract laid out a clear process 
for the distribution of financial rewards by including an incentive (savings-sharing) mechanism 
according to which the parties agreed to share logistics cost savings that the provider would 
generate by restructuring the transport operation. The relevant clause stipulated a 50/50 split of 
any savings achieved against the agreed budget, above a certain monetary threshold. Deviations 
from the specified KPI targets (e.g. 98% delivery timeliness) were linked to financial penalties 
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set as fixed monetary sum per provider failure as well as the provider’s responsibility for 
implementing rectification plans. The contract also specified material breach conditions upon 
which the customer could terminate the contract. These included the failure to achieve KPIs 
threshold for three months or the failure to meet any single KPI standard for six consecutive 
months.  
The formal contract also provided for quarterly reviews of service performance and costs 
and frequent communications. The contract clause ‘cooperation and relationship management’ 
provided for “frequent contact and weekly meetings between the provider’s relationship 
manager and the client’s contract manager” on top of the formal quarterly reviews and also 
referred to the need for parties to “work together on the spirit of cooperation and trust to create 
a mutually beneficial relationship”. These weekly meetings were useful to resolve operations 
issues, as the customer’s Customer Services Manager put it: […] I am talking to [the provider] 
about problems where deliveries haven’t been made on time, good customers have specific 
requirements that they struggle to meet, and just generally the management of problems, so the 
day to day management of it”.  
The clause ‘budget, change to charges and services’ set out broad guidelines for service 
adaptations and revisions of the distribution of financial outcomes (rewards). According to the 
agreement, resource and operating method adaptations could be requested by either party in 
writing, and parties should examine also implementation and cost implications of the proposed 
changes. The cost model (based on which budgets and savings were to be measured) was also 
subject to review and renegotiation via relevant clauses (see Table 3). The ‘budget, change to 
charges and services’ clause was called upon when it became evident that actual resource use 
and costs deviated from the set budget, creating cost savings measurement and provider under-
compensation problems. As the provider’s Managing Director explained, “[…] they [customer] 
didn’t really know what their logistics costs were, I mean savings were evident when we took 
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over the operation but there was no way to know that, they didn’t know how to benchmark that 
internally. We had serious problems agreeing on what these savings were and how much of 
that was due to [our] effort”. The SOW did not allow for volume and price variations per 
operating site and exacerbated the difficulties of measuring cost savings and agreeing on 
provider remuneration (as the incentive fee was linked to savings). The clause enabled such 
adaptations to the payment model and distribution of cost savings.  
Amendments of the cost model (based on cost per tonne charges) and the payment 
mechanism (provider fee as fixed % of annual cost per tonne budget and no longer linked to 
any generated savings) were implemented due to expectations of continuing trade and were 
reflected in the revised SOW (Table 3). Under the adjusted charging structure, the service 
became financially viable for the provider.  
 
5. Discussion  
This section discusses the observed functions that contractual provisions perform in relation to 
perceived uncertainty and relational experience. The findings confirm previous studies stressing 
a codification function (Lumineau et al. 2011; Selviaridis and Spring 2010) as parties arrived 
through the contracting process at a mutually agreed service definition which was reflected in 
the specification schedules (Table 2). However, such codification was limited to service 
activities, resources and performance levels to enable exchange commencement and did not 
include broader roles and responsibilities or exchange contingencies (Mayer and Argyres 2004; 
Blomqvist et al. 2005). In addition, the level of detail and completeness of such service 
codification varied. In cases of extensive relational experience (cases A and B) the contractual 
specification appears to be rather complete in the sense that there were minimum deviations 
from it ex post. Service specification schedules can be significantly adapted during contract 
execution when relational experience is limited (cases C and D).  
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These findings confirm prior studies suggesting that contract specification schedules 
(assignment specifications, SOW and SLAs) function as temporary codification devices 
(Selviaridis et al. 2011; Lindberg and Nordin 2008). Codification of service activities, resources 
and performance levels is more accurate and ‘stable’ when partners have already developed 
good understanding of service operations realities and one another’s requirements, rather than 
when such knowledge is absent and the counterparts rely on invalid assumptions to specify and 
design service delivery (Terho et al. 2012; Tuli et al. 2007). However, it is recognised that 
broader roles and responsibilities of the counterparts can also be codified during prolonged 
contracting processes, even when there is limited relational experience (Lumineau et al. 2011). 
Overall, it is proposed: 
P1: Service specification contract schedules perform a codification function by accurately 
codifying logistics service activities and processes, resources and performance levels when 
relational experience is extensive.  
Several analysed contractual provisions performed a safeguarding function (see Table 3) 
by protecting parties against potential opportunism and financial risks (Argyres and Mayer 
2007). In particular, the findings stress the role of the contract payment mechanism, in addition 
to other provisions, in managing complexity and uncertainty in service exchanges (Roehrich 
and Lewis 2014; Kern and Willcocks 2000). In the cases of extensive perceived uncertainty and 
service complexity (cases A and C) an open-book, cost-plus charging mechanism was used to 
hedge against financial risks and adjust costs according to actual operational expenditure. On 
the other hand, in cases with limited perceived uncertainty and service complexity (cases B and 
D) the parties did not opt for an open-book mechanism. The above suggest that perceived 
uncertainty related to complex and evolving service requirements and changes in the exchange 
environment (Kreye et al. 2015) may motivate contracting parties to adopt more flexible 
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payment mechanisms in formal contracts so as to safeguard against financial risks more 
effectively (Corts and Sigh 2004; Kalnins and Mayer 2004). It is thus proposed:  
P2: Open-book, cost-plus payment mechanisms perform a safeguarding function in logistics 
service exchanges by allowing parties to hedge against financial risks when perceived 
environmental uncertainty is extensive. 
The findings also support prior studies stressing the safeguarding function of termination 
rights (Schepker et al. 2014). These clauses were perceived by several interviewees as an 
important safeguarding tool as they allowed exiting the exchange relationship in case of poor 
provider performance or customer failure to pay on time. In all four contracts such rights also 
catered for allocation of remaining logistics asset liabilities at the termination date. Compared 
to the extant literature (Lumineau and Malhotra 2011; Argyres and Mayer 2007), the empirical 
study provides a more nuanced understanding of how early termination rights are established 
in response to behavioural uncertainty and perceived risks of opportunism in order to safeguard 
against financial losses. It is proposed:  
P3: Provisions for early termination of logistics service exchanges perform a safeguarding 
function by hedging against potential opportunism and associated financial losses when 
perceived behavioural uncertainty is extensive.  
The studied contracts also performed a coordination function by setting up and using 
provisions to review and monitor service performance and costs against the set standards. In 
addition, provisions for formal communications and information exchange meetings were 
established and used in order to resolve operational issues or any other concerns arising during 
the course of the exchange (see Table 3). Compared to the existing literature (Schepker et al. 
2014; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002), the findings offer refined insights 
regarding the high frequency of the stipulated performance review meetings and formal 
communications. More specifically, in cases of extensive perceived uncertainty (cases A and 
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C) arising specifically from service complexity (Kreye et al. 2015), contracts also stipulated 
monthly reviews in addition to quarterly and annual ones.  These more frequent formal reviews 
were deemed appropriate by parties in order to identify and resolve issues related to service 
levels and escalating costs in a coordinated way. It is therefore proposed: 
P4: Contractual provisions for frequent performance reviews perform a coordination function 
by instigating coordinated action to improve logistics service exchange performance when 
perceived uncertainty arising specifically from service complexity is extensive. 
The findings also suggest that contractual provisions for service adjustment and 
renegotiation rights performed an adaptation function during contract execution (Table 3). 
Although specific contingency planning clauses (Argyres et al. 2007; Luo 2002) were not 
evident, clauses regarding services variations and cost and price renegotiations (Schepker et al. 
2014; Crocker and Reynolds 1993) proved useful in the cases exhibiting limited relational 
experience. Specifically, the ‘services variations’ and ‘budget, changes to charges and services’ 
clauses were called upon to adjust the service activity and resource levels and the allocation of 
exchange costs and rewards. Such provisions were also included in cases exhibiting extensive 
relational experience, but they were not invoked since exchange-specific knowledge (e.g. 
volumes, resource use and costs) resulted in minimum deviations from the contractual 
specification ex post. The findings stressing the role of relational experience are counter-
intuitive given that the adaptation function of contracts is often seen as a response to 
environmental uncertainty (Schepker et al. 2014; Ménard and Valceschini 2005), rather than a 
means to manage limited partner- and exchange-specific knowledge. It is thus proposed: 
P5: Clauses of service variations and provisions for renegotiations perform an adaptation 
function by allowing contracting parties to adapt the logistics service exchange ex post when 
relational experience is limited.  
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The studied contracts performed a learning function, albeit to a limited extent. In cases 
of extensive relational experience, learning about efficient collaboration methods, service 
improvements and provider competences was only partly reflected or embodied into renewed 
contracts (Coltman et al. 2009; Mayer and Argyres 2004) through schedule amendments (Table 
3). Hence, no definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding the learning function of logistics 
service contracts and more specifically the impact of accumulated inter-firm learning on 
contract extensiveness (Vanneste and Puranam 2010; Ryall and Sampson 2009). However, it is 
worth noting the role of competence-based trust (Sako 1992), as opposed to trust originating in 
social bonds or the existence of formal controls (Vanneste and Puranam 2010; Nooteboom et 
al. 1997), in mediating the safeguarding function of contracts. Extensive relational experience 
may lead to customer trust in provider competences (but not necessarily so) based on prior 
positive exchange performance. In such instances (see cases A and B) competence-based trust 
can be an alternative explanation for the reluctance to rely on detailed contracts (Kreye et al. 
2015) and safeguarding provisions e.g. penalty clauses.   
Table 4 summarises the findings on the functions that contractual provisions perform in 
relation to perceived uncertainty and relational experience, which suggest a number of research 
implications. First, the empirical study contributes to the existing logistics outsourcing 
literature, which has hitherto emphasised the role of relational mechanisms (Marasco 2008; 
Moore and Cunningham 1999), by unpacking the multiple functions that specific contractual 
provisions perform in governing logistics outsourcing exchanges. More specifically, 
specification schedules, payment mechanisms, (early) termination rights, provisions for 
frequent performance review and information exchange meetings, service variations clauses, 
and renegotiations provisions perform codification, safeguarding, coordination and adaptation 
functions under different levels of perceived uncertainty and relational experience (see 
propositions). Far from having limited functionality or resulting in lack of trust (Halldórsson 
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and Skjøtt-Larsen 2006; Lambert et al. 1999), formal contracts can be used to coordinate and 
adapt service provision in response to environmental changes, and help codify the service 
exchange and partner- and exchange-specific learning.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
 
In addition, the study builds upon recent efforts to examine the potential role of formal 
contracts in managing service complexity (Benedetinni and Neely 2012) in exchange 
relationships. Such literature argues effectively for the impact of complexity on contract design; 
higher complexity may often lead to more detailed contracts in terms of clauses protecting 
against opportunism (Roehrich and Lewis 2014). However, simplified contracts coupled with 
relational capabilities may be more effective, and indeed less detailed contracts may be used 
(Kreye et al. 2015). These studies tend to focus on the safeguarding function of contracts; 
increasing service complexity may require more sophisticated contracts in terms of detailed 
clauses and contingencies to safeguard against risk and opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Roehrich 
and Lewis 2014; Kern and Willcocks 2000). This paper adds to this perspective by suggesting 
that the functionality of contracts extends beyond establishing safeguards (Spring and Araujo 
2014). The empirical study examines also how coordination and adaptation-oriented provisions 
help in managing service complexity and associated uncertainty.  
The findings offer empirical insights regarding when (i.e. under which conditions) 
relational mechanisms and formal contractual provisions complement or substitute each other 
to effectively govern exchnages, an issue that has recently attracted attention (see Cao and 
Lumineau 2015; Schepker et al. 2014; Weber, Mayer and Wu 2009). The study demonstrates 
how formal contracts can perform a codification, coordination or adaptation function under 
different levels of perceived uncertainty and relational experience. More pointedly, it examines 
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when contracts perform codification, coordination and adaptation functions and the ways these 
interact with relational mechanisms. Specifically, service specification schedules, performance 
review and communication provisions, service variations clauses, and renegotiation provisions 
help to reinforce collaboration methods, information sharing patterns and trust, and even codify 
effective working methods and service improvements.  
The findings also present implications for the effects of learning and trust on contract 
design and extensiveness (Vanneste and Puranam 2010; Ryall and Sampson 2009; Reuer and 
Arino 2007) by highlighting the role of competence-based trust. Extensive relational experience 
may lead to competence-based trust, as customers learn about their providers and benefit from 
performance improvements. This can in turn lead to less detailed contracting and removal of 
safeguarding clauses (e.g. penalties for service failures). However, extensive relational 
experience does not necessarily and automatically lead to competence-based trust and less 
detailed contracts; it might actually have the opposite effect (i.e. more detailed safeguarding 
provisions) if providers face challenges in delivering performance improvements1. In contrast 
to the extant literature (Vanneste and Puranam 2010; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009), this study 
suggests that it is trust based on partner competences to deliver the requested performance (Sako 
1992), rather than on social bonds or existing contracts (Nooteboom et al. 1997), that may 
mediate the safeguarding function of contracts. No definitive conclusions can be drawn, though, 
and further research is needed to examine the impact of competence-based trust on contract 
extensiveness.  
 
6. Conclusions  
The extant logistics outsourcing literature emphasises relational mechanisms and has paid less 
attention to the role of formal contracts in governing exchanges. This paper empirically 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for this insightful point.  
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examines the multiple functions that contractual provisions perform in service exchange 
governance. The developed propositions link four contract functions (codification, 
safeguarding, coordination, and adaptation) to specific provisions: specification schedules, 
payment mechanisms, (early) termination rights, frequent performance review and inter-firm 
communication provisions, service variations clauses and renegotiation provisions. Contracts 
also appear to perform a learning function, though to a limited extent. 
The study presents three main research contributions. First, it unpacks the functions of 
contracts in exchange governance, an issue that has hitherto been underplayed in logistics 
outsourcing research (Marasco 2008). The study empirically demonstrates how specific 
provisions and clauses are used to codify the service exchange, to safeguard parties against 
perceived risks and opportunities, to coordinate their actions to improve service delivery, and 
to adapt the service exchange in response to environmental changes. Second, the study builds 
upon recent efforts (Kreye et al. 2015; Roehrich and Lewis 2014) to examine whether, and how, 
contractual safeguards contribute to managing (service) complexity. The paper adds insights by 
extending its analysis beyond the safeguarding function, and stressing also how contracts can 
be used to coordinate and adapt service exchanges in the face of service complexity and 
associated uncertainty. Third, the study contributes to the governance literature which has 
recently turned its attention to specific conditions (when) affecting the interplay of contractual 
and relational mechanisms (Cao and Lumineau 2015). It does so by offering insights into how 
specific contractual provisions that perform codification, coordination and adaptation functions 
interact with collaboration and trust, under different levels of perceived uncertainty and 






6.1 Managerial implications  
Managers of customer and provider firms involved in logistics services contracting should 
consider the specific conditions upon which certain contractual provisions and their associated 
functions should be stressed to improve exchange effectiveness. Under high levels of service 
complexity and uncertainty, managers should deploy formal contracts not only as safeguards, 
but also as coordination devices. More specifically, managers can embed into their contracts 
and instituationalise routines for frequent performance review meetings, whereby the 
counterparts exchange information regarding service delivery, identify operational issues and 
initiative corrective actions to resolve them in a coordinated way. Similarly, under high levels 
of environmental uncertainty and limited knowledge of the counterart’s business requirements, 
provisions for variations in service activity and resource levels (adaptation-oriented provisions) 
should be used in tandem with payment mechanisms that allow for flexibility in monthly costs 
and prices (e.g. open book cost-plus) to protect parties against financial losses arising from 
variation in demand and service volumes.  
Service provider managers should also be aware that their track record of performance 
and customer trust in the firm’s competences may result in customer firms undermining the 
safeguarding function of formal contracts in exchange governance, and refrain from using legal 
and economic safeguards. The contract can be used instead as a framework for inter-firm 
collaboration, allowing for coordinated actions to improve performance and adjust service 
delivery in response to changes in the market or business environment, and for codifying 
effective collaboration and service improvement methods. However, a key caveat here is that 
there needs to be internal alignment between managers and legal advisors who are also involved 
in contract design and interpretation. This often proves to be a problematic area given the legal 
counsels’ mind set and orientation towards safeguarding and the enforceability of formal 
provisions in the courts of law. 
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6.2 Limitations and future research  
The study presents limitations that should be tackled through future research. First, the role of 
competence-based trust in the dynamic interplay of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms (Cao and Luminaeu 2015; Faems et al. 2008) should be further examined. Trust-
building based on positive past collaborations and confidence in partner competences (Sako 
1992) can lead to less elaborate contracts at the contract renewal point, but additional empirical 
evidence is required to establish whether competence-based trust can serve as an antecedent of 
purposeful contractual incompleteness (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Collins 1999). Second, the 
role of power-dependence relationships in connection to contract design and functionality has 
not been addressed in this study. Power-dependence aspects may have a bearing in contract 
functionality, particularly in relation to the assignment of property, decision, and control rights 
to protect parties with low bargaining power (Schepker et al. 2014; Adegbesan and Higgins 
2011). Further empirical research is needed in this respect.  
Third, the paper offered scant insights into the prominence of specific contract functions 
in relation to the exchange timeline. Future studies should attempt to draw links between 
contract functions and exchange stages e.g. regarding the use of codification and learning 
functions both during the contracting process and in the contract execution phase. Fourth, 
further research is needed to understand what sets of contracting capabilities are required 
specifically to perform the codification, coordination and adaptation functions of contracts, and 
how these can be developed (Spring and Araujo 2014). This research highlighted these 
functions (in addition to the safeguarding one) but did not study in detail the associated 
contracting capabilities and their interplay with relational ones.  
Fifth, it is acknowledged that the findings refer to a particular legal-institutional system 
and service industry (UK logistics industry). The findings could, nevertheless, be generalised 
to settings of outsourced public services insofar as formal contracts perform multiple functions 
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in shaping and governing service exchanges (e.g. see the NHS - DHL Supply Chain contract). 
The findings may be less applicable to public infrastructure and complex product-service 
provision whereby coordination and adaptation tends to rely heavily on relational capabilities 
(e.g. Hartmann et al. 2014). Future research should test the research propositions through: (a) 
studying contracts developed within different institutional environments, and their impact on 
service exchange governance (Oxley 1999), and (b) conducting large-scale surveys covering 
contractual relationships in diverse settings (e.g. provision of public infrastructure whereby 
services and capital equipment are integrated into a complex bundle), different service 
industries or even different segments of a particular industry (e.g. e-freight exchanges). Such 
an extended programme of research would help develop a more refined understanding of 
contract functions in service exchange governance. 
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Appendix 1. The Interview guide 
A. Company Information  
 Interviewee details (name, department, job title and role)? 
 Company details (core business, products/services, annual turnover, market share, key 
customers/suppliers)?  
 
B. Service offering and the business relationship 
 Can you briefly describe the customer’s supply chain/logistics structure? 
 What is the scope of the 3PL provider’s service offering?  
 Can you briefly describe the key service activities, processes and resources? 
 Can you provide an overview of the customer/provider relationship in focus? 
 What are the main sources of uncertainty regarding the management of the customer/provider 
exchange relationship in focus, if any? 
 Can you provide a brief account of the customer/provider relationship history and evolution, if 
applicable? (key events and milestones) 
 To what extent have you developed specific knowledge about the customer’s /provider’s 
operations and broader business requirements? 
 
C. The contracting process 
 Can you provide a brief overview of the contracting process (key events and challenges)? 
 Service specification phase/challenges? 
 Provider selection phase/challenges? 
 Economic and contractual negotiations/challenges? 
 Contract development phase/challenges? 
 
D. The contract  
 Contract agreement: structure and content? 
 Provisions in the master agreement? 
 Provisions in the contract schedules?   
 Service level agreements/KPIs? 
 Payment mechanism?  
 To what extent are the contractual provisions used to govern the exchange? Why (not)? 
 How does the contract function in managing the exchange relationship in focus?  
 
E. Post-contract service delivery  
 Service implementation and ongoing delivery?  
 Service performance measurement – any deviations from contract?  
 How has the service exchange been adapted, if at all? 
 What kind of re-negotiations took place, if at all? How were those perceived and handled? 
 What is the role of formal contract in service adaptations and renegotiation? 
 How are service adaptations and exchange developments reflected into the formal contract, if at 
all? 
 What is the role of formal contract, as opposed to that of trust, in managing the exchange 
relationship in focus? 
 
F. Final Questions 
 Relevant organisational documents (e.g. contracts/SLAs)? 
 Return back for supplementary questions?  







Appendix 2. List of interviewees  
 
 




BD Manager (Hi-tech sales team) 
BD Manager (Hi-tech sales team) 
Divisional Development Manager  
Logistics Analyst (Hi-tech sales team) 
Commercials General Manager  
Logistics Analyst (Hi-tech sales team) 
BD Manager (Hi-tech sales team) 
Senior Operations Manager  
BD Manager (Hi-tech sales team) 
 
Logistics Contracts Director 





BD Manager (Industrials sales team) 
Logistics Design Manager (Industrials sales team) 
Logistics Analyst (Industrials sales team) 
Account Director for contract B 
Commercials General Manager  
Contracts Manager  
BD Manager (Industrials sales team) 
 
 
 Logistics Manager  
 Commercial Buyer 
 
Case C Senior Operations Manager  
BD Manager (Home Deliveries) 
Commercials General Manager  
Senior Business Systems Manager  
Logistics Design Manager (Home Deliveries) 
Logistics Design Manager (Warehouse Design Unit) 
Commercials General Manager  
Senior Operations Manager 
BD Manager (Home Deliveries) 
 
_ 
Case D Managing Director  
BD Manager  
Warehousing General Manager  
Account Manager  
Account Manager: client contract D 
Operations Manager: client contract D  
BD Manager  
Business Systems Manager  
Managing Director  














Table 1. Overview of the cases   
 





Manufacturer of office 
equipment machines (e.g. 
copiers and printers) 
 
Manufacturer of paint and 
industrial coatings  
 
Retailer of furniture products and 
home accessories  
 
 





solution   
 
Warehousing, 









customer deliveries of paint 
and industrial coating 
products 
 
Warehousing, cross-docking, call 
centre & home deliveries of 
furniture products; light assembly 




based minerals; the 
service scope included 
management of 
transport sub-contractor 
network across the UK. 
Contract 
duration  












relationship and prior 
exchange experiences.  
22-year trading relationship 
and prior exchange 
experiences.  
Newly-established business 










Extensive; a complex, 
multi-functional service 
was re-tendered for after 
10 years. At the renewal 
point, the customer 
perceived high 
uncertainty in terms of 
defining its technical 
requirements and grasping 
the existing solution 
complexity. Its technical 
knowledge was eroded 
due to turnkey logistics 
outsourcing for more than 
a decade. Failure to keep 
up with technological 
changes and decreasing 
ability to predict and 
specify logistics 
requirements. Perceived 
risk of opportunism by the 
incumbent provider.  
 
Limited; A simple transport 
service was re-tendered for 
after the previous 3-year 
agreement. At the contract 
renewal point perceived 
uncertainty was limited the 
service was perceived as 
simple and entailed 
minimum additional 
requirements. Both the 
customer and provider were 
knowledgeable about 
service requirements and 
costs.   
 
Extensive; Both parties perceived 
the service to be complex. It 
entailed operating in a new 
market environment (UK) with no 
historical volume data and set 
supply chain infrastructure. The 
customer initially had limited 
knowledge of its technical 
requirements which were 
evolving. The provider had 
limited understanding of the 
customer’s sales and logistics 
volume profile and perceived the 
situation to be highly uncertain 







and service volumes. 
Provider developed its 
knowledge about 
service volume and 
resource profile through 
a review of the 
customer’s transport 
operation conduced in 






reinforced by information 
and knowledge sharing 
routines and multiple joint 
projects. High levels of 






and information sharing.  
Trust developed based on 
provider good track record 
of performance  
Limited; no prior exchange 
experiences. The contracting 
process helped to develop mutual 
understanding of goals and 
expectations, as well as to refine 
service requirements and design 
the service based on shared sales 
and volume forecasts 
Limited; no prior 
exchange experiences. 
Mutual understanding 
of goals and 
expectations was built 



















installation & demo, 
put away per product 





















Four warehouses; Core 
fleet plus 
subcontracting during 
end-month peak  
30 vehicles, one 
warehouse; Possible 
subcontracting 
Five warehouses, 14 
line-haul vehicles; 











Based on profile 
assumptions; cost-plus 
charging; separation of 
fixed and variable costs 
 
Based on client delivery 
profile; fixed and 
variable (pence/mile); 
1st year budget included 
 
Based on client 
forecast sales;1st 
year budget agreed; 
cost-plus charges 
No reference to specific 
volumes; service budget 
to be agreed; savings-
sharing (50/50) above 




99.5% pick accuracy, 
99% delivery & 
installation success; 




delivery as joint target 
 
99.5% delivery 
within time window, 
calls answered 
within 78 seconds. 
>98% delivery 
timeliness; <9 end 
customer complaints; 
customer volumes as 
per order; fleet 

















Table 3. Safeguarding, coordination, adaptation, and learning functions of logistics service contracts  
 
 












Combination of fixed 
and variable charges 




Open-book, cost plus 
monthly charges helped 
to reduce uncertainty 
re: volumes and 
resources; ‘third party 





split of savings 








for failures; No 
penalties for failures 
attributable to 
client; 90 days’ 
remedy period 
  
No penalties for 
service failures; List 
of client-caused 
service failures; 
failure analysis and 
corrective action   
Escalating penalties; 
No penalties for 
failures/omission 
attributable to client; 
60-day remedy period 
Penalty as fixed 
amount per service 
failure (£2,000); 








Safeguarding  Termination clause 







clause included to 
hedge risks connected 
to warehouse re-
location project, 
although it was not 
invoked; termination 




clause & termination 
for breach; one-year 





for material breach 
established (but not 
















service levels and 
financial 
performance  
Quarterly & annual 
meetings and review 




Monthly & quarterly 
meetings and review of 
service level 
performance; monthly 
meetings helped to 
identify deviations from 















Adaptation  Annual review of 
service budget and 
costs; provisions of 
price adjustments 
were not used  
 
Annual renegotiation 
of service costs and 
provider prices; 
provision for 
changing cost and 







level/prices were used 
to adjust solution 
Annual review 
(service report) and 
allowance for 
renegotiation of the 
cost model, budget 
and prices; this was 
used to renegotiate the 






Adaptation    Provisions for 
variations in 
resource levels and 
review of service 
costs; these were 




10%) and provider 
payment level, 
although this clause 
was not used 
Provisions for 
variations to service 
resource and activity 
levels (+-10%) were 
invoked to reduce 
resource levels and 
costs 
 
‘Budget, changes to 
charges and service’ 
clause was invoked to 
adapt service 


















reduced depot, trucks 
& product 
loss/damage liabilities 
in renewed contract 
Adjustment of payment 
mechanism (fixed % of 
actual costs); reduced 
resource levels and 
costs by 50% 
Amendment of cost 
model (cost per ton 
budget) and payment 
mechanism (from 
savings sharing to 
fixed % of budget) 






Table 4. Contract functions in relation to perceived uncertainty and relational experience 
 






Under extensive relational experience, 
service specification schedules of the 
contract are used to accurately codify the 
service exchange (P1) 
 
Safeguarding  Under extensive environmental 
uncertainty, open book cost-plus 
contracts are used to safeguard 
contracting parties against financial 
risks (P2) 
 
Under extensive behavioral 
uncertainty, early termination 
clauses hedge against potential 
opportunism and related financial 
losses (P3) 
 
Customer’s trust in provider competences 
based on past service performance and 
provider-specific knowledge may mediate 
the safeguarding function of contracts by 
removing clauses related to penalties, 
liabilities, and so on. 
Coordination Under extensive perceived 
uncertainty arising specifically from 
service complexity, contractual 
provisions for frequent performance 
reviews are used to identify and 
resolve operational issues (e.g. 
service levels and costs) in a 
coordinated way between the 
customer and provider (P4)  
 
_ 
Adaptation  _ Under limited relational experience, clauses 
related to services variations/adjustment and 
renegotiations are used to adapt the service 
exchange e.g. in terms of resource levels, 
costs and payment mechanisms (P5) 
 
Learning  Under extensive perceived 
uncertainty, exchange-specific 
learning (e.g. related to customer 
sales, volumes, resource levels, costs 
and reward allocation) occurring 
during contract execution is partly 
reflected in the contract through 
addendums or revised schedules 
Under extensive relational experience, 
learning related to efficient collaboration 
methods, service improvements and 
provider competences is partly reflected into 
the renewed contract through revised 
specification schedules 
 
 
 
 
